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Abstract
Purpose – This paper reports on a regionally based UK study uncovering what has worked well in
learning from adverse incidents in hospitals. The purpose of this paper is to review the incident
investigation methodology used in identifying strengths or weaknesses and explore the use of a database
as a tool to embed learning.
Design/methodology/approach – Documentary examination was conducted of all adverse incidents
reported between 1 June 2011 and 30 June 2012 by three UK National Health Service hospitals. One root cause
analysis report per adverse incident for each individual hospital was sent to an advisory group for a review.
Using terms of reference supplied, the advisory group feedback was analysed using an inductive thematic
approach. The emergent themes led to the generation of questions which informed seven in-depth
semi-structured interviews.
Findings – “Time” and “work pressures” were identified as barriers to using adverse incident investigations
as tools for quality enhancement. Methodologically, a weakness in approach was that no criteria influenced
the techniques which were used in investigating adverse incidents. Regarding the sharing of learning, the use
of a database as a tool to embed learning across the region was not supported.
Practical implications – Softer intelligence from adverse incident investigations could be usefully shared
between hospitals through a regional forum.
Originality/value – The use of a database as a tool to facilitate the sharing of learning from adverse
incidents across the health economy is not supported.
Keywords Root cause analysis, Adverse incidents, Embedding learning, NHS hospital, Reporting system,
Soft intelligence
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The study informing this paper aimed to develop a regional health economy-wide system
for embedding lessons learnt from serious incidents and never events into practice. In the
UK, adverse incidents, such as wrong-site surgery, are reported by trust/hospital staff
(a trust is an English National Health Service (NHS) organisation generally serving either a
geographical area or a specialised function) to the National Reporting and Learning System,
which is a central patient safety incident database (Alexander et al., 2015). The system
adopts an integrated approach to learning from serious incidents by ensuring that lessons
learnt by NHS staff are properly fed back to improve service delivery across the whole
health service (Department of Health, 2007). However, a big gap exists between
recommended and actioned plans (Wallace, 2010). Consequently, we aim to reduce this gap
by presenting a study conducted in response to never events and Level 2 serious incidents in
three West Midland NHS trusts, serving just under 1.1 million people (Black Country NHS
Foundation Trust, 2016).
Study objectives
Adverse incidents requiring investigation are consistently underreported
(Shaw et al., 2005; Hutchinson et al., 2009; Noble and Pronovost, 2010) and reporting/
feedback systems across different NHS hospitals are highly variable (Renshaw et al., 2008;
Goldsmith et al., 2015). In response, the National Reporting and Learning System was
established in 2003 to achieve a consistent and systematic approach to reporting and
learning from adverse incidents (Williams and Osborn, 2006). However, within this
system, there is little or no systematic follow-up intended to prevent specific failures
reoccurring (Wallace, 2010). Moreover, the system is limited because “learning” is merely
collected and collated from patient safety incidents (Wallace, 2010), i.e., it does not monitor
or support how learning points and systemic recommendations are embedded into
practice. Consequently, Centre for Health and Social Care Improvement, Wolverhampton
University, England researchers’ objectives were to:
• highlight incident investigations as tools for quality enhancement;
• review incident investigation methods – identifying their strength and weaknesses;
• discover what worked well in setting up investigative terms of reference (ToR); and
• explore a systematic approach oriented towards embedding learning from serious
incidents.
The study (August 2012 and February 2013) built on extant documented root cause
analysis (RCA) conducted for serious incidents in three NHS Trusts during June 2011-12.
Initially it was envisioned that researchers would investigate only never events; however,
during data collection, it emerged that no never event had occurred in two trusts in the last
year. Consequently, Level 2 serious incidents, which had occurred in our time-frame,
replaced never events. This approach was rationalised by the fact that the same
processes apply to how lessons are learned from Level 2 serious incidents and never
events. Therefore, we situate learning from incident categories as transferable and refer to
both groups as adverse incidents. Owing to the study’s sensitive nature, we allowed
lengthy implementation time to enable participating managers to address the identified
issues. Implementation time influenced our decision to publish three-year post study.
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Wolverhampton and all
participating trusts.
Design
An advisory group: experienced quality leaders from the region and managers from three
participating trusts were convened to serve as an expert reference group to interpret issues
from a clinical, patient safety and administrative perspective. All adverse events reported
between 1 June 2011 and 30 June 2012 by managers in three Trusts: A – an acute trust;
B – an ambulance trust; and C – a mental health trust were analysed. One RCA per adverse
incident from each trust was selected, anonymised and sent to the advisory group, together
with ToR, to: appraise RCA report quality (as working documents to help embed learning);
compare RCA approaches used by the investigating team; and consider action plans as
working documents to help monitor impact and drive quality. The RCAs were selected on
their frequency (highest), occurrence date (most recent) and the RCA report
(comprehensive reports against 24- and 48-hour reports). Advisory group members
provided feedback, which was analysed using an inductive thematic approach.
Emerging themes generated questions (Appendix) that informed follow-up semi-structured
interviews with advisory group members. Seven in-depth semi-structured interviews were
conducted to obtain incident details and their accompanying RCAs from clinical governance,
patient safety and administrative perspectives. These interviews were analysed by
adopting an inductive thematic approach. Coding reliability was addressed by using
more than one coder to review coding, which ensured that researchers were coding accurately
and consistently.
Findings and discussion
Incident investigations as tools for quality enhancement
Exploring factors that engage staff in adverse incident investigations, “trust” was identified
as a key issue:
People don’t share because they are scared to give information to each other. You need […] an open
relationship; we need to develop open relationships that are based on trust (Deputy Chief
Nurse – Quality and Safety).
Respondents also construed “trust” as the potential for staff to report incidents without
retribution:
I think there is something about people feeling safe […] to be able to talk through maybe what their
part is although it is […] confidential, they can tell you everything (Clinical Governance Manager).
This suggests that in maximising incident investigations fully as tools for quality
enhancement, frontline staff need to be educated on the ethos behind incident investigations.
Managers should ensure that the drive is to promote an organisational culture, which is
favourably disposed towards learning lessons from serious incidents, as opposed to victim
blaming. However, “time” was a barrier to using incident investigations as tools for quality
enhancement. Respondents indicated that the time for conducting investigations often
directly affected the extent to which investigators explored issues:
The complexity of an incident may require a multidisciplinary approach, which the statutory
reporting time does not account for (Service Head).
“Work pressures” were identified as an additional barrier, which mitigated against incident
investigations being used as tools for quality enhancement:
If we’ve got a serious incident [SI] to be investigated and we’ve got to get allocations [total incidents
to be examined] to investigators and we’ve got a limited […] investigators, then obviously work
pressure and then doing their day job, that can, I suppose be a barrier to conducting an in-depth
investigation (Clinical Governance Manager).
Work pressure impacts on incident investigations indicates the need for providers to consider
protected time for investigators, which would minimise the risk of having an investigator’s day
job impinge on an on-going investigation. Similarly, “training” was also identified as another
barrier that affected investigations and contributed to the failure to identify root causes:
When there is a misunderstanding between a contributing factor and a root cause, I think
misidentification can be [among] the biggest factors in getting to the root cause, and I think that is
almost a user error (Clinical Governance Facilitator).
Two from three trusts had a group to scrutinise all investigation reports – ensuring that root
causes have been identified.Where investigation reports wrongly identify root or contributory
causes, this group reviews the report and sends it back to the investigators with suggestions
on how to improve the document and identify the incident’s key causes. Whilst this approach
has advantages, it may affect the investigating team’s independence. Moreover, scrutiny
panels assess the investigation reports, but do not address the underlying requisite skills that
contribute to investigators not identifying root causes, which indicate a broader need
for training adverse incident investigators to be evidence based and contextualised to
patient needs.
Methodological strength and weakness
We found that no methodological criteria influenced the investigator’s decisions. Surprisingly,
investigatory techniques were adopted owing to familiarity with the technique and not
applicability to the incident investigated:
Fishbone analysis tends to get used quite a lot as well and I think that is because investigators feel
more comfortable with those tools (Clinical Governance Facilitator).
Worryingly, where investigators adopted a method to suit an incident’s complexity, this
decision was not reached independently:
As we are going through the investigation, I might talk to somebody about how we might get the
most useful information or what will be the most helpful way of getting to really understand the
cause of the incident that we are looking at (Service Head).
Improved training for investigators in adverse incidents is required. The decision to adopt a
method based on familiarity symptomises investigator’s ignorance about the RCA limitations,
which could be addressed by ensuring that training for investigators appropriately explores
RCA strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, a section could be added to adverse incidents
reports on the method’s rationale, which provides assurance that the decision to use a
technique was reached after carefully weighing its strengths and limitations in context.
Investigative ToR: what worked well?
A committee decided ToR in Trust C, which was not the case in other Trusts. In Trust A,
investigative ToR were usually generated by a division head or an individual in a higher or
equivalent clinical position. In Trust B, clinical leader recommendations guided the
investigating team when the decision to investigate an incident is taken. In Trust C, the
practice was to have a strategy meeting attended by, for example, associate directors,
clinical governance leader and service team manager to identify the ToR and to decide the
investigators to be used. Pre-setting investigatory ToR, positively enhance quality as it
ensures that investigators are set reference terms, which ensure that an incident’s likely
causes are identified. Investigators also recommend ways to prevent re-occurrence, which
ensures that specific issues are flagged that may not be directly connected to the incident
under investigation, but may have potential, in a different context, to trigger the same
incident. However, this approach has limitations, which could potentially limit the
investigating team from exploring issues not contained in their original ToR, but which
could potentially have caused an incident:
I suppose one […] barrier we’ve got is that sometimes these ToR are a bit limited because it is our
initial thoughts that are being investigated, so I think that is something we’ve got to work on,
getting our investigators to design their own questions (Clinical Governance Manager).
The ideal scenario will be for investigators to start adverse incident investigations using
suggested ToR in the first instance and subsequently construct their own terms on an on-
going basis during the investigation. This approach requires skilled handling, which must
be addressed in the adverse incident training provided to investigators. Whilst we observed
that investigating adverse incidents in all trusts, commissioners were encouraged to ask for
specific terms to be investigated, we nonetheless uncovered that there was little unanimity
regarding the commissioner’s active involvement in investigating adverse incidents.
A justification for active involvement was that participation would limit the extent to which
commissioners intervene in on-going investigations as they will be party to the constraints
associated with investigations:
I would like commissioners to be involved in the investigation as well, because […] it helps when it
comes to identifying root causes, we can do it quite quickly and in a timely manner because the
commissioners aren’t having to come back and say why haven’t you talked about that
(Deputy Chief Nurse – Quality and Safety).
Opposition to commissioners’ active involvement revolved around them breaching their
roles as service commissioners:
I think what they have as an on-going thing for me seems sufficient. They are not our managers;
they are our commissioners so in terms of them having lots of input, then that would almost seem
like they are managing us and that isn’t appropriate (Service Head).
Commissioners need to agree with investigative working arrangements with providers
during contract negotiations. This will help clarify the circumstances in which
commissioners could become part of an on-going adverse incident investigation.
Systemic approach to embedding lessons from adverse incident investigations
When respondents were asked to say what systems they would like to see in place to
facilitate learning, we observed that they addressed this question in a database context:
If I look at how we are using our embedding lessons database for sharing information and making
sure everybody sees those recommendations and thinks about how it applies to them, sometime it
does and sometimes it doesn’t but at least they’ve looked and checked and thought about it. I think,
the principle is a good one because it is about having a place where we can share information and
evidence what we are doing […] to meet that standard and mitigate that […] incident happening
(Service Head).
Respondents also indicated that a database creates healthy competition amongst trust
managers in the region:
And I suppose that [database] might generate healthy competition as we might say hang on we are
not populating much here and maybe that will open questions as to why we’re not seeing information
coming from different trusts. Maybe that will be a driver there (Clinical Governance Facilitator).
Importantly, with increasingly constrained resources available to NHS managers, adopting
a database to facilitate learning across the region can lead to economy of scale. Measures
adopted in a trust in response to learning from a serious incident could be adopted
elsewhere, leading to savings in cost and improvement in patient safety:
There are probably lots of areas where if we are sharing learning, this could maybe prevent something
from happening somewhere else if we are sharing that with another organisation (Head of Assurance).
However, there was little unanimity regarding a database as a tool for sharing learning from
adverse incidents. Opposition to a database was about duplicated functions:
I […] recommend caution over the recommendations for another database. Trusts usually have
their own internal databases and are required to report through the National Reporting and
Learning System and the Strategic Executive Information System [NRLS and STEIS]. Another
database, which appears to be limited to a single area, will present entry difficulties for [several]
reasons. It seems logical to adopt an existing national database (Risk Manager).
When respondents were asked how softer intelligence generated from learning could be
shared without a database, they indicated that conferences could help:
I think there are grounds for a regional forum. if we’ve got a regional talking chapter
[regional conference] that met [quarterly or half yearly], where we are taking lessons learnt,
discussing cases, then I think that is one way of getting the softer information because people
talk, databases give you information, but you do not necessarily get the subtleties around that
(Quality Director).
Respondents suggested that conference organisers must ensure that attendance is by people
who can share and disseminate learning within their organisation:
How do you share the effectiveness of the event? Are we pitching it at the right level? Sending a risk
manager to something where they are going to come up with a conclusion that yeah, we’ve got to do
this, is it pitched at the right level? If it is risk mangers that are attending, are they the right people
to be attending? I think if it is commissioning led, you need to be thinking about the director for
quality (Regional Head of Risk and Governance).
Additionally, bringing together trust managers at a conference, organisers must ensure that
shared learning is applicable to all attendees:
My question around effectiveness would be […] what benefit it would be for us attending this
conference because actually, unless it is something like communication, which you already know
you don’t tend to pick up anything that you can transfer across (Regional Head of Risk and
Governance).
More ways to share softer intelligence from adverse incident investigations are needed.
These should be explored with a consideration given to the limitations.
Conclusion
A negative feature identified by staff engaging in our study was that incident investigations
did not report when patient notes were secured after the occurrence of an incident.
We maintain that it is good practice for patient notes to be secured to prevent altering facts
after an incident and advocate that these notes are held immediately after the decision is
taken to investigate an incident as a serious event. We also identified that adverse incident
investigations by only one investigator was a weakness, which does not allow a
multidisciplinary approach that investigations into complex incidents require. Using only
one investigator encourages bias, which more than one investigator overcomes.
We found that actions implemented in response to adverse incidents needed evaluating.
Commissioners, therefore, must ensure that measures are put in place to determine the
extent up to which lessons from adverse incidents have been embedded into their respective
practices, which ensures that learning internally is standardised, which could serve as a
spring board for exporting learning.
Commissioners were not consistently seeking assurances that learning from adverse
incidents had occurred. Usual practice appears to be demonstrating to commissioners that
an adverse incident had not reoccurred. Whilst we acknowledge that this demonstrates
learning from adverse incidents, we advocate that this learning be demonstrated by
providers reporting action plans quarterly and how they propose to audit these actions
at perhaps half-yearly intervals for the first year after implementation. Such reporting
provides assurances that learning from adverse incidents are embedded internally post
incident. Importantly, we advocate that the requirement to report be contractually agreed
between providers and commissioners.
Whilst we do not advocate a lessons database, it is important that salient points
mitigating against the database be addressed if such a system comes into play. For it to be
effective, in the first instance, the database requires ownership from commissioners and
commitment from providers to interact with the system. Commissioners must first recognise
the resource implications and consequently make a cost-benefit case that justifies creating
such a system. This case must also clearly show the difference between new and existing
databases, which providers are statutorily obliged to report and learn lessons. Finally, softer
intelligence from serious incidents investigations could be shared through a regional forum
held quarterly and designed for clinical risk leaders. This forum should be led by the
regional lead commissioner with a mechanism to ensure that learning is cascaded by
attendees into their respective organisations.
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Appendix. Embedding learning from root cause analyses: interview schedule
Method
• What criteria do you use in deciding the method used to conduct an RCA?
• What are the barriers to identifying root causes? How can these be addressed?
• Who suggests and agrees the ToR, RCA scope and level? What changes would you like to see
to this arrangement?
• What input do commissioners have into the serious incident investigation ToR?
• Would you like commissioners to have more input into setting investigation ToR? If no why?
If yes, then why and how could this be achieved?
Embedding learning
• How can RCA outcomes be used for quality enhancement?
• What systems would you like to see put in place to facilitate learning from RCA across the
health economy?
• Would an embedding lesson database facilitate this objective? Prompt: If yes, then how do
you propose a database should work across the Black Country? If no, then why?
• Without a database, what else can we use to capture and share softer intelligence from RCA
lessons?
• What measures can commissioners put in place to improve assurance about embedding lessons
from serious incidents?
• In your opinion, what factors could mitigate against sharing learning from serious incidents
across the Black Country?
• Is there anything we have not covered that you would like to address?
Corresponding author
Cyril Eshareturi can be contacted at: C.Eshareturi@uos.ac.uk
